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Abstract 
One of the areas in which wireless networks based on visible light communication (VLC) are considered 
superior to traditional radio-based communication is security. The common slogan summarizing VLC 
security features is: WYSIWYS - "What You See Is What You Send”. However, especially in the case of 
infrastructure downlink communication, security with respect to data snooping, jamming and 
modification must be carefully provided for. This paper examines the physical layer aspects of VLC 
networks with respect to possible disruptions caused by rogue transmitters. We present the 
theoretical system model that we use in simulations to evaluate various rogue transmission scenarios 
in a typical office environment. We use estimated Bit Error Rate (BER) as a measure of the effectiveness 
of jamming and rogue data transmission. We find that it is quite easy to disrupt, and in some cases to 
even hijack legitimate transmission. 
Keywords: VLC, visible light communication networks, network security, physical layer security, 
transmission jamming, transmission hijacking 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Visible light communication (VLC) is a wireless 
optical communication technology through 
which baseband signals are modulated on the 
light emitted by an LED: [1] – [3]. The 
decreasing cost and hence rapid adaptation of 
LED-based light make VLC a promising 
communication technique and a significant 
alternative to radio-based wireless 
communication. As user demand for data 
transmission throughput and availability 
continues to increase, "traditional" radio-
based communication systems, such as Wi-Fi, 
Bluetooth, ZigBee, etc. fail to deliver because 
of their bounded channel capacity and 
transmission rates due to the limited radio 
spectrum available. VLC data transmission 
networks provide an attractive alternative to 
traditional wireless techniques. 
VLC systems have been proposed and 
implemented both for indoor and outdoor 
applications – see [2] and [4]. Indoor 
applications include a range of communication 
facilities provided today by radio-based WLAN 
and Personal Area Networks (PAN), and range 
from: office communication – [5], multimedia 
conferencing – [6], peer-to-peer data 
exchange, data broadcasting – especially 
multimedia such as home-audio and video 
streams, see: [7] – [10], to positioning: [11], 
[12]. VLC systems also provide a safe 
alternative to electromagnetic interference 
from radio frequency communications in 
hazardous environments, such as mines and 
petrochemical plants, and in applications 
where traditional WLAN communication may 
interfere with specialized equipment, for 
example in hospitals and aeronautics [13]. 
 
 
VLC is also starting to be considered as a way of 
augmenting or even replacing RF networks; for 
example, a wide range of techniques aimed at 
VLC based multimedia networks was 
developed under “hOME Gigabit Access” 
project (OMEGA) [14] sponsored by the 
European Union. The usage of smartphone 
cameras and light sensors brings VLC to the 
field of mobile computing and sensing. VLC has 
the potential to evolve into a general WLAN 
standard – in [15] with the OpenVLC platform, 
the authors have demonstrated that it is 
relatively easy with current Software Defined 
Radio (SDR) toolkits to implement the TCP/IP 
suite on the VLC medium. 
One of the areas in which VLC techniques are 
considered superior to traditional radio-based 
communication is security. The directivity and 
high obstacle impermeability of optical signals 
are considered to provide a secure way to 
transmit data within an indoor environment, 
making the data difficult to intercept from 
outside. The common slogan summarizing VLC 
security features is: WYSIWYS – "What You See 
Is What You Send” [16]. As the recent history of 
IT technological progress has taught us, a 
common mistake in the development of novel 
communication techniques has been to ignore 
or marginalize security issues. Such was the 
case with the IPv4 internet protocol suite, 
fiber-optics based networks, and more 
recently, with early adopted WLAN 
technologies. Currently, the VLC industry 
seems to be on the same path again: the 
indubitable "pro-security" physical 
characteristics of visual light communication 
have steered the developers’ focus away from 
the security track.  
The shared nature of the medium allows 
wireless networks to be easily monitored and 
broadcast on. Attackers may not only easily 
monitor communication but also launch 
jamming (denial of service) attacks. Attacks on 
the physical level that disregard MAC-level 
protocols can effectively block the network and 
are not remedied by traditional security 
mechanisms. A risk assessment of VLC 
communication with respect to the 
communicating parties of three basic classes: 
mobile (smartphones, tablets, wearables, etc.), 
fixed (PCs, peripherals, and appliances) and 
infrastructure (fixed in-room transmitters) was 
conducted in [17]. By analyzing basic physical 
characteristics of the VLC communication 
channel, it was shown that particularly in the 
case of infrastructure downlink 
communication, security with respect to data 
snooping, jamming and modification must be 
carefully provided for. In order to ensure the 
dependability of VLC networks, we must better 
understand the physical layer mechanisms of 
executing a hostile-transmitter type attack. 
This paper examines the physical layer aspects 
of VLC networks with respect to possible 
disruptions caused by rogue transmitters.  
The structure of this work is as follows: in 
section 2, we will describe the current state of 
VLC security research; in section 3, we will 
present the theoretical system model which we 
will use in subsequent simulations to evaluate 
various rogue transmission scenarios; in 
section 4, we will describe the physical 
properties of evaluation scenarios; in section 5, 
we will show and discuss simulation results; 
and in section 6, we will summarize the paper 
and outline areas of future research.  
 
2. Current state of VLC security research 
2.1. Confidentiality and data snooping 
A common assumption in VLC, as stated for 
example in the IEEE 802.15.7 standard [18], is 
that: "Because of directionality and visibility, if 
an unauthorized receiver is in the path of the 
communication signal, it can be recognized." 
However, this is not always true; let us consider 
a case of communication with an 
"infrastructure" transmitter. Both in the case of 
the NLOS channel and LOS, an unauthorized 
receiver may be easily introduced into the 
environment without being recognized. 
 
 
Snooping on VLC transmission is, of course, 
limited by high obstacle impermeability and is 
more difficult than Wi-Fi snooping, but there is 
no obvious reason why it should not be 
possible. In [19], it was shown experimentally 
that eavesdropping on VLC transmission is 
indeed possible. The equipment used, based 
on a standard low-cost SDR design, was able to 
achieve acceptable BER rates in a range of 
different scenarios. The authors evaluated 
different room configurations and were able to 
decode high-order modulated 64-QAM VLC 
signals outside of the room, via door gaps, key 
holes and windows protected by special 
“privacy” coatings. 
Up till now, the confidentiality of VLC 
communication has mainly been tackled on the 
information-theory level, referring to the 
discrete memoryless wiretap channel and the 
metric of the channel's secrecy capacity, as 
originally introduced by Wyner [20]. In [21], the 
authors proposed to use the MIMO technique 
and beam-forming (similar to BF/MIMO 
implemented in Wi-Fi networks) to establish a 
secure channel between the transmitter and 
the receiver located in a particular physical 
location. The BER (Bit Error Rate) was 
minimized at the receiver’s location, while it 
remained unacceptably high in the rest of the 
area. In this way, a potential eavesdropper 
physically located some distance from the 
legitimate receiver was unable to properly 
decode the data. This was attained without 
significant influence on the lighting 
characteristics and was therefore 
unobservable to the users. A similar approach 
was proposed in [22] using the MISO (Multiple 
Input Single Output) technique, together with 
null-steering and artificial noise – an achievable 
secrecy rate was calculated numerically. In a 
related work [23], this approach was also in 
part verified in a real environment.   
2.2. Jamming and data modification 
Let us consider the possible schemes for 
introducing a signal jamming or data-modifying 
device into the VLC infrastructure channel. The 
attacker may choose to use both a directed - 
Line of Sight (LOS) or non-directed Non-Line of 
Sight (NLOS) transmitter-receiver 
arrangement; but, due to power 
considerations, a LOS model will be preferred. 
In general, the attacker's aim is to achieve a 
higher illumination at the receiver than that 
provided by the legitimate transmitter.  
The major practical concern from the attacker's 
point of view is to ensure that the illumination 
provided by the rogue transmitter remains 
undetected by users. Hence, the attacker may 
introduce his own (preferably) highly directed 
transmitter or "hijack" a part of the legitimate 
infrastructure. VLC infrastructure networks 
consist of numerous independent transmitters 
to provide adequate coverage and capacity. 
Multi-transmitter "femtocell" VLC networks 
are also studied as an extension of traditional 
Wi-Fi and cellular networks [24]. In such 
environments, the installation of a rogue 
transmitter may easily pass undetected. A 
second possibility is hijacking a part of the 
legitimate VLC infrastructure via a wired or 
wireless channel. In a large installation, such 
malicious intervention may easily pass 
undetected.  
Data modification in VLC networks may be 
attained by reactive jamming techniques. As 
was demonstrated in [25], real time reactive 
jamming is easily in reach of attackers with the 
use of SDR technology. In the above mentioned 
work, ZigBee (IEEE 802.15.4) protocol devices 
were used – it is worth noting the MAC-level 
similarities of ZigBee and the VLC 802.15.7 
standard. 
3. The system model 
The system components are an LED 
transmitter, consisting of multiple light 
sources, and a photodiode receiver. The 
received signal depends on the physical 
characteristics of the transmitting LED, the 
receiver, and channel characteristics which, in 
turn, are determined by a room's physical 
properties (dimensions, wall reflectivity). We 
 
 
use ray optics to calculate signal and noise 
levels and to derive adequate metrics. We 
assume the MISO (Multiple Input Single 
Output) model with multiple luminaires, each 
consisting of multiple transmitting LEDs (both 
legitimate and rogue) and one photodiode 
detector. A single transmitting LED is 
characterized by a half-power semi-angle and 
center luminous intensity (measured in cd). 
The receiver is a simple non-imaging 
photodetector with an optical filter, optical 
concentrator and a single photodiode element. 
Its characteristics are as follows: the FOV (field 
of view) angle, the gain (being a product of 
filter and concentrator gains), the 
photodetector area and the conversion 
efficiency (measured in A/W).  
The metric that we use to measure the impact 
of the rogue transmitter is the Bit Error Rate 
(BER), which depends on the SNR (Signal to 
Noise Ratio) and modulation scheme, for M-
PAM modulation: 
 𝐵𝐸𝑅𝑃𝐴𝑀(𝑆𝑁𝑅)
≅
𝑀 − 1
𝑀 log𝑀
𝑄(√
𝑆𝑁𝑅
2(𝑀 − 1)
) 
 
 
𝐵𝐸𝑅𝑠 = 𝐵𝐸𝑅𝑃𝐴𝑀(𝑆𝑁𝑅𝑠) 
(1) 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
The approximation in (1) results from the 
assumption that only one bit errors occur in 
Gray coding [26]. 
We calculate SNR as follows: 
 
𝑆𝑁𝑅𝑠 =
𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎
2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
(𝑁 + 𝑠𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑒
2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
 
(3) 
 
where 𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 is the data signal, 𝑠𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑒 is the 
signal transmitted by "rogue" (interfering) 
luminaires, and N is noise.  
 
We want to test the influence of the rogue data 
source on the legitimate transmitter, as well as 
the opposite: how the legitimate transmitter 
influences the signal quality of the rogue one. 
Hence, we also want to calculate the BER and 
SNR assuming that the rogue signal is data and 
that the legitimate signal is treated as noise: 
 𝐵𝐸𝑅𝑟 = 𝐵𝐸𝑅𝑃𝐴𝑀(𝑆𝑁𝑅𝑟) 
where 
𝑆𝑁𝑅𝑟 =
𝑠𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑒
2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
(𝑁 + 𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎
2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
The problem of noise in VLC environments has 
been studied in detail [27]. In general, the 
following noise sources should be considered: 
background and transmitting LED shot noise, 
thermal noise in the detector and the influence 
of ISI (Inter Symbol Interference): 
 𝑁 = 𝜎𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑡
2 + 𝜎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙
2 + 𝜎𝐼𝑆𝐼
2  (6) 
 
where N is the total noise variance and 
𝜎𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑡, 𝜎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙, 𝜎𝐼𝑆𝐼 is the standard variance of 
shot, thermal and ISI respectively. Proper 
estimation of noise in VLC environments is 
crucial in studying maximum attainable 
transfer rates under various conditions and 
modulation schemes. The input-referred noise 
variance depends on the signal data rate; for 
data rates of interest in our scenario (105 – 107 
bits/s), the dominating noise factors are ISI and 
background shot noise. Hence, we will consider 
only these sources: 
 
 𝜎𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑡
2 = 2𝑞𝑅𝑃𝐵 + 2𝑞𝐼𝑏𝑔𝐼2𝐵 (7) 
 
where q is the electronic charge, R is the 
responsivity of the photodiode, B is the 
equivalent noise bandwidth, P is the received 
power, Ibg is the background current; and 
where for a p-i-n/FET receiver, we assume I2 = 
0.56.  In the multi-luminaire study that we 
conduct in this paper, the dominant noise 
factor is the interfering signal from neighboring 
luminaires and not physical noise itself. 
Now we will present an analytical model of the 
optical wireless channel, which will let us 
derive SNR and BER measures for different 
physical scenarios. 
 
 
A single LED is a Lambertian emitter – its 
radiation intensity is a cosine function of the 
viewing angle and is given by: 
 
𝑅(𝜃) = 𝑃𝑡
(𝑚 + 1)
2𝜋
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑚(𝜃) 
 
(8) 
 
where 𝜃 is the irradiance angle, 𝑃𝑡 is the 
transmitted power and m is the order of 
Lambertian emission which is given by the 
irradiance semi-angle 𝜃1/2 (the half-power 
angle):  
 
𝑚 = − 
ln 2
ln( cos( 𝜃1/2))
 
(9) 
 
Light propagates from the LED to the receiver 
via a channel which is modeled by the direct 
channel transfer function hd: 
 
ℎ𝑑 = {
(𝑚 + 1)𝐴 cos𝑚(𝜃)
2𝜋𝑑2
cos(𝜓) 𝑅(𝜑)
0 
 
0 ≤ 𝜃
≤  𝜃𝐹𝑂𝑉  
 
𝜃 >  𝜃𝐹𝑂𝑉 
(10) 
 
where 𝜃 is the irradiance angle, 𝜑 is the angle 
of incidence, A is the receiver’s area,  𝑅(𝜓) is 
the receiver’s gain, d is the distance from the 
LED to the receiver and 𝜃𝐹𝑂𝑉 is the receiver’s 
field-of-view semi-angle. The geometric model 
of this simple LOS (Line of Sight) case is shown 
in Fig. 1.  
To make the model more realistic, we will also 
consider the effect of first reflections from the 
walls; the channel transfer function for the 
reflection path – hr is: 
 
ℎ𝑟 =
{
 
 
(𝑚 + 1) A cos𝑚(𝜃)
2𝜋2𝑑1
2𝑑2
2 𝜌 𝑑𝐴𝑤cos(𝛼) cos(𝛽) cos(𝜓) 𝑅(𝜑)
0 
 
 
0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤  𝜃𝐹𝑂𝑉 
 
𝜃 >  𝜃𝐹𝑂𝑉 
(11) 
 
where  𝜃 is the irradiance angle, 𝜓 is the angle 
of incidence, A is the receiver’s area,  𝑅(𝜑) is 
the receiver’s gain, 𝑑1  is the distance from the 
LED to a reflective point, 𝑑2  is the distance 
from a reflective point to the receiver, 𝜌 is the 
reflectance factor, dAw is a reflective area 
surface element, α is the angle of irradiance to 
a reflective point and β is the angle of 
irradiance to the receiver. The geometric 
model of this case is shown on Fig. 1. 
For a single source, the output signal of the 
LED transmitter is given by the following 
general formula: 
 𝑝𝑂(𝑡) = 𝑃𝑡[1 + 𝜇 𝑥(𝑡)]  (12) 
 
where: 𝑃𝑡  is the power transmitted from a 
single LED, µ is the modulation index, and x(t) 
is the modulating signal. Assuming that the 
receiver is DC blocked, we get the following 
general formula for the received signal: 
 𝑠(𝑡) = ℎ 𝑃𝑡  𝜇 𝑥(𝑡)     (13) 
 
Considering the "legitimate" and "rogue" sets 
of transmitters, we obtain the following: 
 
𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎(𝑡) =  ∑ {𝑃𝐿𝐸𝐷 𝜇 𝑥(𝑡) ℎ𝑑 +∫ 𝑃𝐿𝐸𝐷 𝜇 𝑥(𝑡)𝑑ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑓
𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠
}
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎_𝐿𝐸𝐷𝑠
 
 
𝑠𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑒(𝑡) =  ∑ {𝑃𝐿𝐸𝐷 𝜇 𝑥(𝑡) ℎ𝑑 +∫ 𝑃𝐿𝐸𝐷  𝜇 𝑥(𝑡)𝑑ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑓
𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠
}
𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑒_𝐿𝐸𝐷𝑠
 
 
 
 
(14) 
 
 
 
(15) 
 
 
 
 
 
We use (14) and (15) in a numeric model to calculate the BER as given in (2) and (4) for our scene.
 
 
Fig.  1  The geometric model of the LOS (left) and NLOS (right) illumination. 
 
 
Fig.  2 General simulated scene view – both "legal" and "rogue" luminaires are arranged on the 
luminaire plane. 
 
4.  The simulated scene  
4.1. The simulated environment 
For our numerical simulations, we will use a 
standard "office environment" arrangement, 
akin to the ones typically used in similar work 
[1, 21, 22, 23, 24]. However, we have decided 
to adopt a larger room size than was 
considered in the above mentioned work, as in 
our opinion it better fits real-world 
environments. We have also considered 
realistic luminaire arrangements used with 
typical off-the shelf lighting products.  We have 
designed a single room scene illustrated in Fig. 
2. The room’s dimensions are: 7m x 7 m x 2.8 
m. The detector's photodiode at the reference 
plane is set at the "desk level" – 0.85 m. The 
 
 
room and VLC system’s parameters are given in 
tables 1, 2 and 3. We have tested several 
different scenarios of luminaire placement 
with different arrangements of legitimate and 
rogue transmitters. To design and verify 
luminaire arrangement, we used a two-step 
approach: in the first step, a specialized CAD 
tool [28] was used. This allowed us to set-up 
realistic scenarios based on standard luminaire 
components. The scene was initially designed 
to provide ergonomic lighting conditions which 
meet current standards2 [29, 30]. A sample 
scene as modeled in the CAD tool is shown in 
Fig. 3. The light power levels, the SNR and BER, 
for different luminaire placement scenarios 
were calculated numerically according to 
formulas (2), (4), (14) and (15) - as described in 
section 5. 
We have simulated three luminaire placement 
scenarios:  
1. G1 – a 3x4 recessed luminaire grid – 
Fig. 4,  
2. G2 – a 2x4 recessed luminaire grid 
with an additional 1x3 array of 
"downlight" lower power elements – 
Fig. 5,  
3. GC – a 2 x 3 luminaire grid surrounded 
by a circular arrangement of lower 
power "downlight" elements – Fig. 6.  
The first scenario is the most common, 
standard solution for office spaces. The second 
scenario is a typical light placement for office 
spaces (meeting rooms, open spaces, etc.), 
with downlights providing additional 
illumination in recessed areas which are 
further from natural sources of light, such as 
corridors, etc. The third scenario provides a 
more uniform light distribution in the room 
perimeter, which is a favorable feature for VLC 
communication. In scenario G1, one type of 
luminaire is used - a square 60 x 60 cm panel 
module with a 70 deg. radiation semi-angle. In 
scenarios G2 and GC, two types of luminaires 
are used: a square 60 x 60 cm panel module 
with a 70 deg. radiation semi-angle and lower-
power luminaires with a narrower radiation 
semi-angle of 30 deg. In all cases, we have 
introduced rogue transmitters. 
4.2. Rogue transmitter choice and placement 
We have tested various scenarios of rogue 
transmitter placement, taking into account the 
practical possibility of an attacker modifying 
the VLC infrastructure. We have only 
considered scenarios in which a whole set of 
LEDs constituting a luminaire is taken over by 
an attacker. This is a realistic assumption taking 
into account the fact that all LEDs in the 
luminaire are driven by a single amplifier and 
modulator, and it is not technically feasible to 
hack "a part" of the luminaire. Scenario G1 
corresponds to the case where one of the 
luminaires was physically modified or replaced 
(Fig. 4) – one out of 12 luminaries is a rogue 
one. Two different rogue transmitter 
placement options were tested here – central 
and peripheral. In scenario G2 – Fig. 5, we 
considered the possibility of an attack where 
one or all 3 of the downlight luminaires are 
taken over. In scenario GC – Fig. 6, we tested 
the possibility of taking over all 10 (the full 
"circle") or 5 (half of the "circle") of the 
downlight luminaires. 
 
Table 1 – Physical parameters of the simulated scenarios 
Photodetector parameters  
FOV (field of view) 60 o 
Detector area 1 cm2 
Detector gain  4.5 
Room parameters  
                                                          
2 Although some controversy remains as to the 
proper light-level standards for office workers, we 
have assumed an optimal level of 500 lx and not 
less than 300 lx for the desk surface. 
 
 
Dimensions 7m x 7 m x 2.8 m 
Reference plane height 0.85 m 
Wall reflectivity coefficient 0.8 
 
Table 2 – Physical parameters of the simulated scenarios – the luminaire arrangement 
Scene type: G1 G2 GC 
Scene description: 3 x 4 grid 2 x 4 grid + 1 x 3 2 x 3 grid + circle 
horizontal luminaire 
spacing 
180 cm 150 - 180 cm 240 cm 
vertical luminaire spacing 150 cm 180 – 240 cm 180 cm 
# luminaires type "g" 12 8 6 
# luminaires type "d" - 3 10 
Rogue luminaire 
arrangement 
1 type g 1, 3 type d 1,5,10 type d 
 
Table 3 – Physical parameters of the LEDs and luminaires 
Luminaire type: type "g" type "d" 
Dimensions 60 x 60 cm 20 x 20 cm 
LED irradiance semi-
angle at half power 
70 deg 30 deg 
(45, 50 deg) 
Luminous flux 2000 lm 1600 lm 
# of LEDs 36 9 
LED placement 6x6 square grid, 
10 cm spacing 
3x3 square grid, 5 
cm spacing 
 
 
Fig.  3 – Screenshot from the "Relux" CAD tool used in the planning of the luminaire layout. 
 
 
 
 
Fig.  4 – Scene G1, luminaire arrangement - the 
rogue luminaires in two sub-scenarios are g7 or 
g10. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6 – Scene GC, luminaire arrangement - the 
rogue luminaires in two sub-scenarios are d1-d10 or 
d1-d5. 
Fig. 5 – Scene G2, luminaire arrangement - the 
rogue luminaires in two sub-scenarios are d2 or 
d1-d3. 
 
5. Simulation results 
In all the scenarios, we show the logarithmic 
plots of the computed Bit Error Rate achievable 
for legitimate and rogue data transmission: 
BERs (2) and BERr (4). We assume that a 
maximum BER level of 10-3 is required for 
effective transmission. 
Scene G1 – in this scenario, we test an 
arrangement with one rogue transmitter 
placed in two locations: centrally and 
peripherally. With the rogue placed centrally, 
legitimate transmission is jammed in 11% of 
the total room area – Fig. 7; with peripheral 
placement, legitimate transmission is jammed 
in 18% of the area – Fig. 8. With the BERr not 
lower than 10-1, effective rogue transmission is 
not possible in this scenario – Fig. 9, 10.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7 – Simulation results: BER for scenario G1 
– central rogue placement. 
 
Fig. 8 – Simulation results: BER for scenario G1 
– peripheral rogue placement. 
 
 
Fig. 9 – Simulation results: BER for rogue data, 
scenario G1 – central rogue placement. 
 
Fig. 10 – Simulation results: BER for rogue data, 
scenario G1 – peripheral rogue placement.
 
Scene G2 – in this scenario, we test two sub-
arrangements: with one and with three rogue 
transmitters. In the case of one rogue 
transmitter placed centrally in the downlight 
row – legitimate transmission is jammed in 10% 
of the total room area – Fig. 11. Rogue 
transmission is possible in a very limited area 
directly under the transmitter (less than 1% of 
the total area) – Fig. 12. With three rogue 
downlight luminaires legitimate transmission is 
jammed in an area of 42% – Fig. 13, while rogue 
transmission is possible in an area of 10% – Fig. 
14. 
 
 
 
Fig. 11 – Simulation results: BER for scenario G2 
– one rogue luminaire. 
 
Fig. 12 – Simulation results: BER for rogue data, 
scenario G2 – one rogue luminaire. 
 
Fig. 13 – Simulation results: BER for scenario G2 
– three rogue luminaries. 
 
Fig. 14 – Simulation results: BER for rogue data, 
scenario G2 – three rogue luminaries. 
 
In this scenario we have also tested the impact 
of an irradiance semi-angle on the BER, 
increasing 𝜑1/2 from the default value 30
 o deg. 
to 45 o, for all type "d" (rogue) luminaires 
(transmitted power remains constant). As the 
semi-angle is increased, the BERr increases to 
values in the range of 10-1, making rogue 
transmission infeasible – Fig. 15 and Fig. 16. 
With an increase in the rogue transmitter semi-
angle, the area of jammed legitimate 
transmission (BERs above 10-3) increases from 
10% to 25% (comparing with results shown on 
Fig. 11). 
 
Fig. 15 - Simulation results: BER for scenario 
G2, semi-angle for "d" luminaires increased to 
45 deg. 
 
Fig. 16 - Simulation results: BER for rogue data 
for scenario G2, semi-angle for "d" luminaires 
increased to 45 deg. 
 
 
 
Scene GC – in this scenario, we also test two 
sub-scenarios: with 5 and 10 rogue 
transmitters. In the first case, half of downlight 
luminaire "circle" is rogue; in the second sub-
scenario, whole downlight "circle" consists of 
rogue luminaires. With 5 rogue luminaires, 
legitimate transmission is possible in an area of 
50%, while rogue transmission again is 
attainable only in small recessed areas (less 
than 2.5% of the total area) – Fig 17,18.  With 
10 rogue luminaires on the perimeter, jamming 
is very effective -legitimate transmission is 
possible only in an area of 25% – Fig. 19, while 
rogue transmission is feasible only in the 
recessed room areas (less than 5% of the total 
area) – Fig. 20.  
 
Fig. 17 – Simulation results: BER for scenario GC 
– 5 out of 10 luminaires in the circular 
arrangements are rogue. 
 
Fig. 18 – Simulation results: BER for rogue data, 
scenario GC – 5 out of 10 luminaires in the 
circular arrangements are rogue 
 
Fig. 19 – Simulation results: BER for scenario GC 
– all luminaires in the circular arrangements 
are rogue. 
 
Fig. 20 – Simulation results: BER for rogue data, 
scenario GC – all luminaires in the circular 
arrangements are rogue 
 
 
6. Summary 
VLC networks are currently considered as a 
means of augmenting traditional radio-based 
WLANs. However, the issues of VLC security are 
only beginning to be tackled. As with radio-
based networks, the shared nature of optical 
medium allows adversaries to generate 
jamming and hijacking attacks. In this work, we 
have presented a numerical study of a VLC 
system with rogue transmitters. To the best of 
our knowledge, it is the first time the problem 
of interfering legitimate and illegal VLC 
transmission has been considered. Our 
simulation "scenes" have been designed and 
 
 
verified with a CAD planning tool to ensure 
relevance to real-world environments. We 
have numerically calculated the Bit Error Rates 
of interfering legitimate and rogue 
transmission in various office room scene 
arrangements. We have concluded that it is 
feasible, with limited access to the transmitter 
infrastructure, to jam transmission in a large 
area of up to 40% of the whole scene. It is also 
possible to introduce illegal transmission on 
limited areas of up to 10% of the whole scene. 
In our opinion, this study brings forward the 
issue with the security of VLC based wireless 
LANs with respect to rogue transmission. As 
WYSIWYS – "What You See Is What You Send” 
remains mostly a slogan, appropriate security 
mechanisms must be implemented in the data-
link layer (and/or higher network layers) to 
cope with the possibility of rogue 
transmissions. Detecting the presence of a 
jamming attack in VLC networks also remains 
an open issue. In [31], various "consistency 
checking" methods for detecting a wireless 
radio jammer have been proposed; the 
adoption of these techniques for VLC systems 
and the development of new rogue transmitter 
detection methods dedicated to VLC would 
also be interesting areas for future research. 
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